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1. Introduction 
People with health impairments are at risk of social exclusion because of the 
physical, financial, and attitudinal barriers that they face in the labor market. Findings 
from the United States and Great Britain indicate that the unemployment probabilities 
of those with health problems are higher than those of individuals without health 
problems, while those who are employed earn less (Johnson and Lambrinos, 1985; 
Baldwin and Johnson, 1994, 2000; Kreider, 1999; Kidd et al., 2000; DeLeire, 2001; 
Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Campolieti, 2002; Kruse and Schur, 2003; Jones et. al., 
2006). Ill health, however, is a restriction or inability rather than a demographic 
characteristic, and there is not a single, consistently used definition or method for 
classifying it. Hence, pledge generalizations are not the case
1. 
The economic analysis of workers living with ill health within the labor market 
has been neglected in Greece. An illuminative exemption is the 2002 study undertaken 
by the General Secretarial of National Statistical Service of Greece, but this study lacks 
wage data. The main findings suggest that 16.2% of the total populations are health 
impaired, and among them, 83% are economically inactive as compared to the 58% of 
the total population. Half of them, 53.6%, claim employment problems due to their 
health status, and 40.2% feel that they are socially excluded. These figures are 
especially striking when considered in the context of recent legislative and other 
reforms aimed at securing improvements in the labor market position of health-impaired 
and disabled individuals. In 2005, Greece adopted the European Antidiscrimination 
Directive (EC/78/2000), perceived as a hallmark in the quest of individuals with ill 
health for equal access to labor market opportunities. The national Antidiscrimination 
Legislation (3304/2005) helps to protect people with health problems against 
discrimination in the workplace. Protection is provided against discrimination in 
recruitment, employment, dismissal and the like for a reason related to ill health. A 
failure to comply with these requirements is itself an act of unlawful discrimination 
unless it can be justified by a reason that is both material to the circumstances of the 
case and substantial
2.  
                                                     
1 A Eurostat (2002) study shows that health status is not evenly distributed; with each step up 
the socioeconomic ladder, groups are less vulnerable to disease, ill health and premature death. 
Genetics, the physical environment and early childhood experiences all influence overall 
population health in addition to the socioeconomic environment. Perceptions can also differ for 
each culture, thus making comparisons more or less irrelevant. 
2 Defenses include the extent of the employer’s financial and other resources, the costs of 
making the adjustments and the extent to which other activities would be disrupted.   3 
The aim of the current research is to examine for the first time in Greece to what 
extent differences in earnings for health-impaired male workers can be attributed to 
productivity differences and/or discrimination. Work productivity is an important 
determinant of labor force behavior. Unlike minority groups that are afforded protection 
under the law, persons with health impairments are likely to have health problems that 
limit their capacity for some types of work and their earnings (Baldwin and Johnson, 
1994). In the current research, as in DeLeire (2001) and Jones  et al. (2006), to 
distinguish between productivity differences and discrimination against health impaired 
people, the Athens Area Study 2008 sample separates individuals into three groups: the 
healthy, the health-impaired who report that their health status limits their work capacity 
in a sense that affects the type and amount of work that they can do; and the health-
impaired who report that their productivity at work is unaffected by their health 
condition. 
Following Jones  et al.’s  (2006) reasoning, assuming that health-impaired 
employees with no work limitations do not have lower productivity relative to healthy 
workers as a result of their health status, we can interpret the assigned wage difference 
as an estimate of discrimination. However, if the degree of discrimination is assumed to 
be the same between health-impaired employees having work limitations and health-
impaired employees having no work limitations, the wage penalty of the work-limited 
group less the measure of discrimination for the non-work-limited group may be 
considered as an estimate of the lower productivity of the group having work limitations 
relative to the healthy group that is not captured by the measured characteristics 
included in the empirical model. Thus, to advocate for the existence of discrimination 
against health-impaired workers, intermediate steps should be followed. 
Some studies, including Nagi (1979) and Stern (1989), have concluded that self-
reports of health conditions are unbiased. However, whether an individual has a health 
problem and whether it is work limiting are both subjective, and there may be social and 
economic incentives to misreport health status (Bound, 1991). This major complicating 
factor, which has received growing attention, is the endogeneity of self-assessed health 
measures. Much of the literature suggests that we should be especially skeptical about 
non-workers’ responses to questions about health status since certain incentives may 
lead them to systematically over-report the extent to which a health condition limits 
their work capacity. Health-related work limitations may be one of the few socially 
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acceptable reasons for men younger than normal retirement age to be out of the labor 
force. Furthermore, the subjective nature of self-reported health also means that the 
responses may not strictly be comparable across individuals, and measurement errors 
are possible, which may also render health measures endogenous. 
In the current research, by using detailed information on objective health 
conditions available in our sample, we are able to consider the potential bias associated 
with self-reported health status when estimating the impact of health impairments on the 
labor market for the entire working age population. This is an application of the well-
known switching regression model proposed by Lee et al. (1980), Maddala (1983), and 
Amemiya (1985) and discussed heavily in the applied literature. In the current modeling, 
we also have to deal with sample selection bias associated with individuals’ 
employment/unemployment status by utilizing Heckman’s (1974) selection model. 
Without controlling for sample selection, any differences in the employment 
probabilities may actually be confounded by variations between characteristics that 
affect individuals’ labor supply decisions. 
The present research makes an important conceptual contribution to our 
understanding of health-impaired people in the Greek labor market. In identifying the 
statistical effect of health status on income, we aim to provide a richer empirical 
backdrop for further analysis of wage gaps and antidiscrimination policy. The rest of the 
paper is divided into five sections. The next section describes the data sources. Section 
3 presents the descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the model and estimation 
procedures. Section 5 presents the estimations, followed by a discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
2. Data Set 
The data were gathered from March to December 2008 in Athens, the capital of 
Greece, as part of the Athens Area Study (AAS) conducted by the University of Piraeus, 
University of Central Greece and Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences. 
The 2008 AAS is one component of the Multi-City Study of the Scientific Center for 
the Study of Discrimination (SCSD). The current AAS consists of telephone-based 
surveys that were administered to approximately 8,700 households. Males in each 
household were randomly selected to provide information on a variety of demographic   5 
characteristics. The interviews were restricted to employed and unemployed
3 
respondents aged 18 to 65 years. Wage is measured as a continuous variable. The AAS 
constructed an hourly wage measure by dividing the last month’s wages, called NLHN, 
by self-reported working hours per month. Surveyors asked, “What is your best estimate 
of your wage last month before taxes and other deductions?” The earnings variable is 
the natural logarithm of hourly earnings.  
In the current study, we use self-reported information on specific health 
conditions. There are three types of individuals in our sample. The healthy (non-
impaired) people are represented by N, the health-impaired people having work 
limitations are represented by D
WL, and the health-impaired people having no work 
limitations are represented by D
NWL. Respondents were asked about the presence of 
work limitations in the following question: “Do you have a long run, over 12 months, 
health condition that limits the kind or amount of work you can perform?” Individuals 
were also asked: “Do you have a long run, over 12 months, health condition that does 
not limit the kind or amount of work you can perform?” The type of variable used to 
control for health status is of crucial importance since the results for some of the 
economic variables of interest, as well as the estimates of the effect of health status, will 
depend on the nature of the health variable used in the analysis.  Individuals may have 
an impairment that they do not perceive to be work limiting and, as such, a work-
limiting health status measure may underestimate the number of people with ill health 
and the employment and wage rate for the health-impaired
4 population as a whole 
(Burkhauser et. al., 2002; Dave et al., 2008). 
The sample includes additional information regarding a broad list of functional 
activities (FA) and other limitations in daily activities (DA) and instrumental activities 
(IA) as explanatory variables because of their potential productivity-related limitations. 
The main advantage of such questions is that they give direct information on work 
ability and are extensively used in labor market analysis (Kruse and Schur, 2003; 
Hollenbeck and Kimel, 2008). Moreover, the focus on chronic illnesses is important in 
the context of employment given the link between work and leisure. Additional 
                                                     
3 We define unemployed as a person who is available to work and seeking work but currently 
without work. 
4 Notice that, in addition to the severity of the impairment, whether a health problem is work 
limiting will depend on a range of factors ,including an individual’s own employment 
opportunities, the accessibility of workplace technological advances, changes in the nature of 
employment and labor market conditions (Baldwin and Johnson, 2001; Kruse and Hale, 2003; 
Kruse and Schur, 2003).  
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indicators are defined separately for whether the respondent reported that he has been 
diagnosed with the following illnesses: diabetes (DIA); heart disease (HEA); arthritis 
(ART); psychological problem (PSY); and cancer (CAN). In this study, we also 
incorporate the presence of disability/heath status benefits, which is defined as DB.  
There are numerous factors besides health conditions that may influence wage 
levels. To isolate the effect of health impairments on wages, we must appropriately 
control for all other factors that affect wages and correlate with health. Some of these 
factors pertain to respondent productivity. The productivity variables used in the study 
are age, education, fluency in the Greek language, and occupation. The variable AGE 
measured the respondent’s age in years. To allow for a non-linear relationship between 
wage and age, the square of age (AGESQ) was included in the regression. The variable 
MARR was set to one if the respondent was married and zero otherwise. The variable 
CHIL measured how many children each respondent has. The variable HOMEM 
measured the respondent’s household members. The variable IMM was set to one if the 
respondent was an immigrant (non-Greek) and zero otherwise. The variable FLUEN 
was equal to one if the respondent spoke the Greek language well or very well and zero 
otherwise.  
The variable SCHOL was set to one if the respondent had completed the 
minimum mandatory education level, and it was zero otherwise. The variable GRAD 
was set to one if the respondent had graduated from high school and zero otherwise. 
The variable UNIV was set to one if the respondent had a university or technical school 
diploma and zero otherwise. The coefficients of these variables measure the effects of 
degree completion compared to workers who did not attain a comparable educational 
level. The variable PC was set to one if the respondent had computer skills (ECDL 
diploma) and otherwise it was zero. The variable ENGL was set to one if the respondent 
had knowledge of English and zero otherwise (FCE diploma). The variable DRIV was 
set to one if the respondent had a driving license and zero otherwise.  
The variable EXPER measures the respondent’s total years of working 
experience. For reasons discussed above, we also included the square of experience 
(EXPERSQ). Three dummy variables for occupational categories were included in the 
analysis. The variable WHITE was set to one if the respondent’s occupation was 
considered white-collar, and otherwise it was zero. The variable BLUE was set to one if 
the respondent’s occupation was considered blue-collar, and otherwise it was zero. The 
variable SERV was set to one if the respondent’s occupation was considered a service   7 
occupation, and otherwise it was zero. For greater occupational control, two additional 
variables were considered. The variable PUBL was set to one if the worker was 
employed in the public sector and zero otherwise. The variable PRIV was set to one if 
the worker was employed in the private sector and zero otherwise. In addition, the 
variable IC was set to one if the employee had insurance coverage and zero otherwise
5. 
Finally, the dummies MON_1 to MON_10 represent common time effects (10 months). 
As interviews were conducted over a period of ten months, it was necessary to control 
for common time effects via time dummies. For convenience, variables’ definitions are 
summarized in the Appendix, Table I. 
 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample of adults consists of 7,071 healthy people (81.01%), 735 health-
impaired people having work limitations (8.42%) and 922 health-impaired people 
having no work limitations (10.56%). At first glance, Table II, in the Appendix, the 
hourly wages of health-impaired men having work limitations seem to be slightly higher 
than those of both health-impaired men having no work limitations and healthy men. To 
correctly interpret this measurement, notice that the mean age differs significantly 
among the subgroups. Health-impaired people are significantly older, reflecting the fact 
that many impairments are age-related, which is one explanation for the higher mean 
pay levels of the health-impaired individuals with work limitations. Considering the age 
difference, health-impaired workers having no work limitations were found to have a 
greater chance of being married than health-impaired workers having work limitations 
and healthy workers. The group of workers with the highest rate of marriage also 
proved to have more children than the other groups. In addition, health-impaired 
workers’ households consisted of more members than healthy workers’. The differences, 
however, are relatively small.  
The number of years that healthy and health-impaired employed men devote to 
education is very different. Healthy workers have a greater chance of completing 
mandatory education, high school, and university/technical school than health-impaired 
workers. We observe that health-impaired workers with work limitations are less likely 
to have completed the minimum mandatory education than health-impaired workers 
                                                     
5 In Greece, employee registration with insurance coverage implies mandatory contribution 
payments, for both the employer and the employee, based on employee wage level, which can 
not be lower than the legal minimum wage according to employee characteristic (human capital 
and marital status).    8 
having no work limitations. As a result, health-impaired workers having work 
limitations are less likely to have a high school diploma than health-impaired workers 
having no work limitations and are less likely to have completed a university/technical 
school program than other groups. Furthermore, health-impaired workers are less likely 
to have computer skills, English knowledge, and a driving license than healthy workers. 
Among employed men, health-impaired workers having no work limitations 
have more years of working experience than health-impaired workers having work 
limitations. At the same time, healthy workers have less working experience. Once 
again, the age differences among the subgroups can explain the assigned trends. A 
potentially important difference between health-impaired and healthy workers is 
occupational category. Health-impaired workers having work limitations are more often 
employed in white collar jobs than health-impaired workers having no work limitations 
and healthy workers. Only a small fraction of health-impaired workers having work 
limitations are employed in blue collar jobs, followed by health-impaired workers 
having no work limitations and healthy workers. The same pattern holds in service 
occupations.  
Health-impaired employees having work limitations are over-represented in the 
public sector, followed by health-impaired employees having no work limitations and 
healthy workers. In addition, health-impaired employees having work limitations are 
less frequently employed in the private sector, followed by health-impaired employees 
having no work limitations and healthy workers. As our data demonstrate, the chances 
of being employed by the Government are higher for health-impaired workers. 
Legislation that potentially affects the costs of either labor force participation or of 
hiring a group of workers can be expected to impact the labor market of that group. 
Finally, health-impaired employees are more likely to report having insurance coverage 
than healthy workers. 
Based on Baldwin and Johnson (1994), we exploit the availability in the AAS of 
detailed reports of chronic conditions. As expected, those conditions - diabetes, heart 
attack, arthritis, emotional problems, and cancer - are frequently reported for health-
impaired employees who are work limited. In addition to chronic conditions, the AAS 
contains detailed information on the three categories of health and functional, daily 
living and instrumental activities. Similarly, in all classifications, health-impaired 
workers who declared having work limitations are likely to face tighter constraints in all 
such activities.    9 
Focusing on unemployed individuals, we can see that health-impaired people 
face unemployment at an older age than healthy workers. This outcome is reasonable as 
health impairments exhibit themselves largely at older ages. Notice also that age 
discrimination might be prevalent for those groups, further reducing their chances in the 
market. Among unemployed men, health-impaired individuals having no work 
limitations are more likely to be married than men in the other two groups. Moreover, 
due to age differences, health-impaired unemployed men are likely to have more 
children and household members than healthy unemployed men. Like the healthy 
employed workers, healthy unemployed people have greater education attainment and 
more special skills (computer, English and driving knowledge) than health-impaired 
unemployed people. However, health-impaired unemployed men have more work 
experiences than healthy unemployed men due to the age difference. In addition, health-
impaired unemployed males having work limitations reported more chronic medical 
conditions, as well as more significant constraints in their daily, instrumental and 
functional activities than health-impaired unemployed males having no work limitations. 
As a consequence, health-impaired unemployed people having work limitations receive 
more disability/health benefits than health-impaired unemployed people having no work 
limitations. 
Health-impaired men having work limitations face a 37.9% unemployment rate. 
The health-impaired populations having no work limitations are unemployed at a lower 
rate of 22.3%, while healthy people face an unemployment rate on the order of 10.2%. 
This result supports previous findings that health-impaired people have higher rates of 
unemployment than healthy people (Kruse and Schur, 2003; Jones  et. al., 2006). 
Importantly, notice that health-impaired unemployed men face a greater chance of 
having chronic conditions and constraints in everyday life activities than health-
impaired employed workers. The low employment rates observed for health-impaired 
persons could be due in part to the high reservation wages associated with certain types 
of health conditions as a consequence of the extra demands on time and energy required 
to participate in the labor force and disability/health income transfers. 
Individuals suffering from health impairments will incur a large cost to enter the 
labor market as, holding all else constant, greater effort or sacrifices must be made 
relative to healthy workers. The net result is that fewer health-impaired people will 
choose to enter the labor market, ceteris paribus. Low employment rates might also be 
due to the low market wage rates offered to the health-impaired as a consequence of   10 
lower levels of productivity and/or employment discrimination (Kruse and Schur, 2003). 
A mere perception of lower productivity or greater difficulty of predicting a health-
impaired worker’s productivity will reduce the likelihood of the individual being hired. 
The existence and expectation of discrimination may also affect the decisions of the 
health-impaired with regard to participation and investment in education and skills, 
resulting in the health-impaired having inferior characteristics in the labor market. Pre-




There are a number of theoretical links between health status and work that 
suggest that better health improves labor outcomes (Becker 1965, 1966). The standard 
labor market economics model assumes that individuals select the combination of 
consumption and hours of work that maximizes their utility, subject to budget and time 
constraints. Health may be incorporated into the standard model through the budget 
constraints; through the time constraint via a lower wage offer; via more absences, 
reducing time available for work; or through the utility function itself if poor health 
reduces utility (Etlner, 2000). 
Our empirical work is based on the standard human capital wage equation 
developed by Mincer (1974). We develop our estimates by systematically modifying the 
Mincer Equation. The wage equations written below relate the calculated wages to 
dummy variables for the demographic and control variables. We use the natural 
logarithm of the wage variable, which increases the efficiency of estimation because it 
increases the extent to which the variable approximates a Gaussian distribution. It also 
allows for an easier interpretation of the coefficients as percentages. 
Equations (1) and (2) present a linearly estimable specification of this basic 
model estimated by work-limited and non-work-limited health status, respectively: 
 
i WD i N WD i i i D a W 1 1 1 1 / ln e g b + + C + =                                   (1) 
 
i NWD i N NWD i i i D a W 2 2 2 2 / ln e g b + + C + =                              (2) 
 
where W i = hourly wage of individual i; X i  = vector of characteristics that describe 
individuals and that are thought to be related to wages; 
i WD D = dummy variable that   11 
equals 1 if the individual has a work limitation based on his ill health ) ( i WD and 0 if the 
worker is healthy  ) ( i N ; 
i NWD D = dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual is in ill 
health but it is not work limiting ) ( i NWD and 0 if the worker is healthy ) ( i N ; %1, %2, &1, &2, 
’1, ’2= parameters to be estimated by the OLS model; and  (1i, (2i, =  error terms. The key 
variables of interest are the dummy variables indicating that the worker is in poor health; 
i WD D and 
i NWD D . Following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the percentage impact on 
wages given the presence of the characteristic represented by the dummy variable must 
be measured using the formula  } 1 ) {exp( 100 100 - = y y , where ) = the relative effect on 
wages and y = the dummy variables’ coefficient. 
In any study, isolating unbiased outcomes requires attention to unobserved 
heterogeneity. In the current study, we addressed this issue as it relates to the effects of 
health and potential employment heterogeneity by estimating a preliminary employment 
equation in order to construct an Inverse Mills Ratio term that will serve as a statistical 
correction when estimating wage equations for only individuals with observed wages
6 
(called LAMBDA_1). An estimation procedure proposed by Heckman (1974) was 
applied, which translates sample selection into a problem of an omitted variable. It is 
important to correct for sample selection given that ill health in particular is unlikely to 
affect a random subset of the population as a whole. Indeed, if wage discrimination 
against health-impaired workers is substantial and leads those subject to significant 
discrimination to exit the labor force, the estimate of wage discrimination would be 
below its true level. This ratio is known as the hazard rate in reliability theory. 
  Our empirical work relies on the following specification of the Probit model 
applied to employment, in which the continuous latent variable 
*
i x , reflecting 
preferences for paid work, is expressed as the observed discrete employment outcome: 
 
*i = 1 if   0
* > i x                        (3)                      
    = 0 otherwise, 
 
where i i i i D a L + + E + = e g b x 3 3 3
* ; *i = 1 if individual i participates in the labor market 
and has positive wages and is 0 otherwise; Di = health status identification; %3 , &3 , ’3 
are parameters to be estimated by the probit model; and (*i is an error term. The 
                                                     
6 For instance, the sample in Equation 1 is systematically selected according to the condition  
(1i >  - %1 - &1Xi – ’1DWDi . As a result, the expected value of the error term is not zero, and the 
use of OLS generates inconsistent estimates.   12 
variables that are included in the estimation of employment, Ei, but not wages, and that 
therefore help the model’s identification, include, the number of members in the 
household, and 10 common time effects. We then use the Inverse Mills Ratio, which we 
denote as ) ( / ) ( i i i E F E f b b l =
)
, for each observation in the sample of workers, where f 
and F are the standard normal and cumulative density. 
When an individual’s health status is not observable by the data collector, the 
respondent has a choice to make about whether to report the condition. The incentives 
the individual faces, both economic and psychological, may affect his reply to the health 
limitation questions, which means that the self-reported measures will be endogenous. 
This kind of endogeneity of self-reported measures is likely to amplify the effects of 
health on employment. The most common empirical strategy for dealing with the 
endogeneity in these self-reported measures is to use objective health measures that can 
be used to supplement self-reported health status (Stern, 1989). The explanatory 
variables that we use to explain and identify health status, besides the individual’s age, 
are the detailed health measurements: functional disabilities, limitations in daily 
activities and other instrumental activities, the presence of diabetes, heart disease, 
arthritis, psychological problems, and cancer, as well as the presence of disability/health 
benefits. 
The precise model to be estimated is an endogenous regression model analogous 
to those described by Maddala (1983) and Amemiya (1985). This method is common in 
the empirical literature, and we replicate the empirical work in Lee et. al (1980), Lee 
(1983),  Dubin and McFadden (1984), and Zhang  et al. (2009). For empirical 
convenience, we estimate the work-limitation health model by Conditional Logit as in 
Hollenbeck and Kimmel (2008). We then create a Mill’s ratio term, which is used as an 
extra regressor in the wage equations (called LAMBDA_2). 
Let the observed work-limitation be represented by: 
 
j Tij =  if 
* *
ik ij f f >    , for all  j k „ ,           (4) 
 
where  ij ij j ij S e m f + =
*  ; 
*
ij f  = is the latent variable describing the propensity of 
individual i to report work health status j; j = healthy individuals, health-impaired 
individuals having work limitations, or health-impaired individuals having no work 
limitations;  ij S = vector of characteristics describing i that are thought to be related to   13 
the likelihood of reporting status j;  j m = vector of parameters to be estimated by Logit; 
and (ij= error term. We assume that the (ij are independent and identically distributed 











ij j ij i j T ob
m m e e                                                                 (5) 
 
and the + parameters can be estimated by a Maximum Likelihood Logit model. We use 
the Health-Reporting-Mills, which we denote as  i w
)
 , for each observation in the sample 
of workers, where  ), 1 /( ) ln(
*
i i i i P P P
) ) )
- = w and  i P
)
= predicted probability. Although 
chronic illness and activities do not appear in the wage and selection equations, they 
still indirectly impact the respondents’ wage and employment through the endogenous 
health variables. 
  Equations (6) and (7) present the wage regressions above, which include 
correction terms to adjust the employment selection correction term, as well as the 
endogenous stratification on reported health status: 
 
i i i WD i N WD h v D a W
i i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 / ln e w l g b + + + + C + = ) )
                                    (6) 
 
i i i NWD i N NWD h v D a W
i i i 2 2 2 2 2 2 / ln e w l g b + + + + C + = ) )
                              (7) 
 
Estimations of Equations (6) and (7) yield consistent parameter estimates (Amemiya, 
1985).  
 
5. Estimations and Discussion 
The results of first-stage Probit regressions on employment selection and 
Conditional Logit regressions on self-reports of health conditions are in the Appendix, 
Tables III and IV. Table 1, below, presents coefficients from the OLS wage regressions. 
Panel A documents a large and significant wage gap on the order of 21.1% for health-
impaired employees having work limitations relative to healthy employees (see the 
transformation in Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). As shown, health-impaired 
employees having work limitations have significantly lower monthly earnings than 
healthy employees. Human capital theory suggests that differences in wages can be 
explained by differences in workers’ education; more educated workers tend to earn    14 
Table 1. Selectivity and Health-Reporting Corrected Wages  




Healthy Employees / vs 
Health-Impaired 
Employees having  
No Work-Limitation 




  -0.211 (0.010)*     -0.116 (0.007)*    
AGE  0.072 (0.002)*      0.074 (0.002)*     
AGESQ  -0.0006 (0.0000)*     -0.0006 (0.0000)*    
MARR  0.046 (0.006)*       0.039 (0.006)*      
CHIL  0.032 (0.009)*  0.037 (0.010)* 
IMM  -0.029 (0.009)*      -0.012 (0.005)*     
FLUEN  0.013 (0.028)       0.011 (0.031)     
SCHOL  0.051 (0.011)*       0.052 (0.011)*      
GRAD  0.057 (0.006)*       0.059 (0.006)*      
UNIV  0.073 (0.005)*      0.070 (0.005)*      
PC  0.008 (0.005)      0.003 (0.004)     
ENGL  0.010 (0.003)*      0.007 (0.003)*     
DRIV  0.037 (0.007)*       0.038 (0.007)*      
EXPER  0.021 (0.001)*      0.022 (0.001)*     
EXPERSQ  -0.0002 (0.0000)*      -0.0002 (0.0000)*     
WHITE  0.019 (0.009)*       0.013 (0.006)*      
BLUE  0.008 (0.004)*       0.009 (0.004)*     
SERV  0.008 (0.009)       0.009 (0.009)     
PUBL  0.005 (0.010)       0.005 (0.010)     
PRIV  0.018 (0.010)       0.013 (0.011)      
IC  0.010 (0.007)      0.011 (0.017)     
INTERCEPT  1.384 (0.053)*     1.384 (0.055)*     
LAMBDA_1  1.947 (1.322)  1.604 (1.102) 
LAMBDA_2  0.504 (0.359)  0.636 (0.493) 
ADJ. R
2  0.334  0.395 
N.  7806  7993 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. 
 *** Significant at the 10% level 
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more because of their increased productivity. To the extent that human capital variables 
are unable to explain wage differences between groups, the remainder of the assigned 
differential is generally interpreted as evidence of discrimination. However, in this case, 
health-impaired employees do have capacity limitations. The 21.1% difference between 
the healthy workers and health-impaired workers who are limited in terms of their 
productivity is likely to be due to the combined effects of health incapacity and 
discrimination. 
On the other hand, Panel B documents a significant wage difference on the order 
of 11.6% against the health-impaired employees with no work limitations relative to the 
healthy employees. As long as the two groups of workers have no productivity 
differences, the observed difference can be interpreted as a measure of discrimination 
against the health-impaired workers having no work limitations. An individual’s 
productivity will not be limited in a job that does not require workers to perform the 
functions that are affected by his or her health impairments. Even when a job requires 
the performance of functions that are limited by a worker’s medical condition, the 
limitations may be offset by compensatory technologies or workplace modification. 
Thus, impairment that limits the amount or kind of work individuals can do, does not 
necessarily limit their productivity in all jobs for which they are otherwise eligible. Our 
estimations seem to be in line with other empirical studies. Baldwin and Johnson (1994) 
distinguished between handicapped and disabled workers and found that 14.7% 
attributed to discrimination. DeLeire (2001) found that an earnings gap of roughly 5 to 
8% was due to discrimination.  Jones et. al. (2006) found comparable evidence of wage 
discrimination against individuals with chronic medical conditions.  
Studying labor market discrimination against persons with health impairments is 
more difficult than analyzing discrimination against ethnic minorities and women 
because the characteristics that identify individuals as “persons with ill health” also 
limit productivity. Following DeLeire (2001) and Jones et al. (2006) and assuming that 
the degree of discrimination is the same among health-impaired employees regardless of 
their work capacity, then if we subtract the health-based discrimination factor (11.6%) 
from the wage difference calculated for health impaired employees having work 
limitations (21.1%), we can estimate that the “productivity penalty” of health-impaired 
employees having work limitations is on the order of 9.5%. As our estimations show, 
health-impaired workers face two penalties of similar magnitudes: a productivity   16 
penalty resulting from their capacity constraints and a health-based discrimination factor 
for being in poor health. For convenience, our analysis is summarized in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Discrimination and Productivity Components of the Healthy and Health-
Impaired with Work-Limitations Wage Gap 
Components  Coefficients 
- Combined Effects (1) + (2)   21.1% 
- (1) Health-based discrimination factor  11.6% 
- (2) Productivity penalty  9.5% 
 
With respect to other variables of interest, the results are as expected. Age, 
marital status, and number of children have positive and statistically significant effects 
on wages. The variable used to control for immigrant status has a negative and 
significant impact on earnings in both specifications. On the other hand, fluency in 
Greek has a positive but insignificant effect on earnings. Work experience has a positive 
and significant correlation with earnings. Each education variable is positive and 
significant in each specification. A higher return on education is observed for those with 
a degree from a university or technical school. Moreover, special knowledge of 
computers, English, and driving have positive effects on earnings. Concerning the 
occupation covariates, all but one have positive effects on the dependent variable. In 
white-collar and blue-collar jobs, we observe positive and statistically significant 
covariates. The assigned positive effects for service occupations and public and private 
jobs are statistically insignificant. Those who have insurance coverage earn 
insignificantly higher wages.  The controls for sample selectivity and endogeneity of 
self-assessed health responses are statistically insignificant in both regressions. This 
implies the success of the steps taken to deal with these issues, which might have biased 
the analysis of the return of health-impaired individuals to the labor market. Empirical 
analysis shows that the signs of the coefficients of the variables that measure human 
capital are consistent with human capital theory. It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that numerous factors that should affect the level of wage discrimination, such 
as the importance of unobservable skills, apparent qualifications, precision of 
observable skills, and ease of performance measurement, may vary greatly across jobs. 
The observed discrimination trend both violates principles that are central to 
Greek democracy and imposes high costs on health-impaired people. When people and 
groups are consistently denied equal opportunities, perceive law enforcement as   17 
providing little protection, and face discrimination in other aspects of community life, 
this combination adds up to a powerful recipe for exclusion. As such, it forms the 
antithesis of inclusion, which is the fundamental notion of integration. Hence, 
discrimination opposes the interest of equality. Thus, it is interesting to ask how 
previously proposed theories explain the observed effects associated with health-
impaired people. Economic discrimination occurs when persons of equal productivity 
are offered unequal wages or unequal opportunities for employment. Discrimination can 
result from prejudice (Becker, 1957) and differential information concerning the 
average productivity of majority and minority workers (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). 
The basic argument of Becker’s discrimination model suggests that health-
impaired people potentially face lower earnings. The distaste hypothesis describes 
discrimination as a preference or taste for which the discriminator is willing to pay. In 
particular, the taste for discrimination by employers is based on the idea that they want 
to maintain a physical or social distance from certain groups or they fear that their 
customers or co-workers will dislike transacting with health-impaired people. Instead of 
making the common assumptions that employers consider only the productivity of 
employees, that workers ignore the characteristics of those with whom they work, and 
that customers care only about the quality of the goods and services provided, Becker 
suggests that discrimination coefficients incorporate the influence of characteristics 
unrelated to productivity, such as tastes and attitudes toward health-impaired people.  
The statistical theory of discrimination may also explain the lower wages earned 
by the health-impaired population. The common hypothesis embraced by classical 
economists is that competition in a capitalist economy decreases the impact of 
discrimination. Discrimination imposes a cost on the employer, and therefore, a profit-
driven employer will avoid racist hiring policies. Statistical discrimination predicts that 
unequal treatment is a result of a profit-maximizing response by employers to 
uncertainty about the quality of individual workers (Arrow, 1973). In a world of 
imperfect information, employers face risks regarding workers’ productivity and 
specific characteristics become inexpensive screening devices. If employers believe that 
there is a systematic difference between health-impaired people and healthy people in 
their reliability, aptitude, and job stability, then sufficient conditions exist to create a 
permanent differential in wages. The beliefs of employers and other influential groups 
that health-impaired people are less productive can be self-fulfilling. In this situation, 
discrimination is not the consequence of exogenous preferences, but a result of the   18 
profit-maximizing behavior of risk-averse employers. Unlike in the Taste theory, in the 
Statistical theory, employers’ prejudices are irrelevant. 
Overall, the outcomes are consistent with the most competing theories of 
discrimination reviewed in this study. Nevertheless, we have to notice that we have no 
conclusive evidence to distinguish among these theories. We can only acknowledge that 
it is speculation as to whether taste, and/or statistical motivations are responsible, and 
the implications which each has for the differential evidence of discrimination. From a 
policy perspective, whether taste discrimination, or statistical discrimination plays a 
major role in wages is significant. If taste discrimination accounts for the unexplained 
lower wages of health-impaired people, then antidiscrimination legislation may be the 
only appropriate response. On the other hand, if statistical discrimination is important 
then better means of assessing workers’ productivity may contribute to the reduction of 
discrimination at the individual or group level. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
more complicated formulations of the human capital approach have suggested a wider 
range of factors responsible for determining wage differences between majority and 
minority workers. For instance, Segmentation Theory made an attempt to demonstrate 
the roles of workplace practices and organizational levels in creating inequalities and 
leaving productive potential underutilized (Rubery and Wilkinson, 1994; Rubery, 1995). 
The issue of health discrimination is then complicated by the wide variety of firm-
specific labor markets, the strong influence
 of occupational factors in determining 
employment practices
  and their impact on health-impaired workers’ employment 




Over the past several years, policy makers have recognized the importance of 
expanding employment opportunities and eliminating barriers to obtaining employment 
for health-impaired people. These initiatives represent not only important policy 
changes, but also a fundamental recognition of the importance of work for people with 
health impairments. Despite the premise underlying legislation intended to assist people 
with health impairments, surprisingly, no Greek empirical economics literature exists 
                                                     
7 Following an anonymous referees’ meaningful point we use an interaction term of the 
dummies of health impairments (D
WL / D
NWL) with being employed in the public sector (PUBL). 
Coefficients for the health status variables change only modestly, but an interesting result is 
found. The wage estimations show positive interaction between health impairments and public 
sector, each at the 5% level. Thus, one additional factor might identify as a cause of the wage 
gap is the difference in occupations in which healthy and health-impaired are employed. 
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that measures discrimination against those groups. This study provides a useful 
benchmark against which one may judge the potential impact of the antidiscrimination 
legislation. Our hope is that by carefully formulating alternative motivations for wage 
differentiation against health-impaired people in the labor market, we have established 
an adequate foundation for future theoretical and empirical research. The systematic 
study of employment discrimination against health-impaired people is valuable for both 
its policy relevance and its potential to inform social scientists and policy makers about 
the functioning of the labor market. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Discrimination against health-impaired people has been totally ignored by the 
Greek economic literature. In the current study, we report the first estimates of the 
economic effect of being health impaired in the Greek labor market using the 2008 
Athens Area Study. We attempted to examine to what extent differences in labor market 
outcomes between health-impaired and healthy workers may be attributed to differences 
in productivity and/or discrimination by using objective long-run illness in a 
simultaneous equations model of endogenous reported disability and labor force 
participation. A group of health-impaired workers who self-reported that their 
productivity is not affected by their impairment was used to measure the effects of 
discrimination separately from the effects of poor health on wages. A penalty for heath-
impaired employees having work limitations exists. Evidence of wage discrimination 
against health-impaired employees having no work limitations was also observed. Both 
findings are statistically significant. The discrimination trend is consistent with the 
Taste and Statistical theories. Currently, health-impaired people do not appear to face a 
level playing field in the Greek labor market, even three years into the national 
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Appendix. Table I. Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name  Definition 
NLHN  Natural logarithm of hourly wages 
AGE  Years of age 
AGESQ  Squared years of age 
MARR  1 if respondent is married; 0 otherwise 
CHIL  Number of  respondent’s children  
HOMEM  Number of members in household  
IMM  1 if respondent is an immigrant; 0 otherwise 
FLUEN  1 if respondent is fluent in the Greek language; 0 otherwise 
SCHOL  1 if respondent has completed minimum mandatory education; 0 otherwise 
GRAD  1 if respondent has graduated from a high school; 0 otherwise 
UNIV  1 if respondent has university or a technical school diploma ; 0 otherwise 
PC  1 if respondent has computer skills (ECDL diploma); 0 otherwise 
ENGL  1 if respondent has knowledge of English (FCE diploma); 0 otherwise 
DRIV  1 if respondent has a driving license; 0 otherwise 
EXPER  Total years of working experience 
EXPERSQ  Squared years of working experience 
WHITE  1 if respondent’s occupation is among managerial or professional specialties, or the respondent 
works in a technical, sales, or administrative support position; 0 otherwise 
BLUE  1 if respondent’s occupation is among precision production, craft, or repair occupations, or the 
respondents works as an operator, fabricator or labourer;  
0 otherwise 
SERV  1 if respondent is in a service occupation; 0 otherwise 
PUBL  1 if respondent is employed in the public sector; 0 otherwise 
PRIV  1 if respondent is employed in the private sector; 0 otherwise 
IC  1 if employee is registered with insurance coverage; 0 otherwise 
D
WL  1 if the respondent has a work-limitation; 0 if the respondent is healthy (N) 
D
NWL  1 if the respondent has a non-work limitation; 0 if the respondent is healthy (N) 
FA  1 if the respondent has difficulty, in a sense of limited skills/constraints, performing one or 
more functional activities, for instance, seeing, hearing, speaking, lifting/carrying, using stairs, 
walking, or grasping small objects; 0 otherwise 
DA  1 if the respondent has difficulty, in a sense of limited skills/constraints, with one or more 
activities of daily living, for instance, getting around inside the home, getting in or out of bed 
or chair, dressing, eating and toileting; 0 otherwise 
IA  1 if the respondent has difficulty,  in a sense of limited skills/constraints, with one or more 
instrumental activities of daily living, for instance, going outside the home, keeping tract of 
money and bills, preparing meals, doing light housework taking prescription medicines in the 
right amount at the right time, and using telephone; 0 otherwise 
DIA  1 if the respondent has ever been told by doctor; diagnosis, that he has diabetes; 0 otherwise 
HEA  1 if the respondent has ever been told by doctor that he had a heart attack, coronary heart 
disease, angina, congestive heart failure, or other heart problems; 0 otherwise 
ART  1 if the respondent has ever been told by doctor that he has arthritis or rheumatism; 
0 otherwise 
PSY  1 if the respondent has ever been told by doctor that he had emotional, nervous, or psychiatric 
problem; 0 otherwise 
CAN  1 if the respondent has ever been told by doctor that he had cancer;0 otherwise 
DB  1 if the respondent receives disability/health benefits; 0 otherwise 
MON_1 - MON_10  Common Time Effects 
LAMBDA_1  Employment Mills 
LAMBDA_2  Health Mills 
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Table II. Descriptive Statistics 
Healthy People  Health-Impaired 







Employed    Unemployed     Employed  Unemployed     Employed  Unemployed   
 
Number of Observations  6,347  724  456  279  716  206 
Mean hourly earnings (natural log)  3.61  -  3.63  -  3.64  - 
Mean age  35.72  29.42  46.01  50.04  42.02  46.11 
Percentage who are married  65.51%  47.03%  72.55%  70.63%  74.12%  67.43% 
Mean number of children in household  0.91  0.67  1.21  1.11   1.23  1.33 
Mean number of household members  4.23  4.33  4.38  4.54  4.24  4.41 
Percentage who are immigrants   6.34%  12.23%  5.44%  5.01%  5.79%  9.82% 
Percentage with Greek fluency  99.46%  99.07%  98.20%  98.40%  98.24%  98.01% 
Percentage completing minimum 
mandatory education 
95.42%  97.54%  89.42%  89.65%  92.51%  91.64% 
Percentage of high school graduates   83.44%  84.56%  73.10%  68.11%  78.34%  68.45% 
Percentage of university or technical 
school graduates 
45.81%  46.64%  40.11%  40.18%  45.93%  43.20% 
Percentage with computing skills  69.31%  78.42%  57.09%  45.13%  61.85%  53.32% 
Percentage with English skills   44.28%  34.92%  35.33%  39.03%  38.93%  34.98% 
Percentage with driving license    89.90%  81.04%  29.11%  19.74%  76.93%  56.76% 
Mean years of experience   14.80  9.16  22.17  25.94  19.89  23.26 
Percentage in white-collar jobs  39.52%  -  82.22%  -  64.80%  - 
Percentage in blue-collar jobs  49.81%  -  11.83%  -  25.93%  - 
Percentage in service occupations  12.86%  -  5.54%  -  11.56%  - 
Percentage in public sector  39.36%  -  76.01%  -  67.54%  - 
Percentage in private sector  58.11%  -  23.20%  -  30.30%  - 
Percentage of employees being 
registered with insurance coverage 
86.06%  -  91.46%  -  90.55%   - 
Percentage who has difficulty 
performing one or more functional 
activities 
0.00%  0.00%  7.80%  8.65%  5.33%  6.74% 
Percentage who has difficulty with one 
or more activities of daily living 
0.00%  0.00%  13.31%  15.43%  6.90%  8.75% 
Percentage who has difficulty with one 
or more instrumental activities 
0.00%  0.00%  16.42%  14.37%  7.11%  9.23% 
Percentage who has ever been told by 
doctor that he has diabetes 
0.00%  0.00%  11.12%  13.92%  8.73%  9.75% 
Percentage who has ever been told by 
doctor that he had a heart attack 
0.00%  0.00%  46.43%  45.86%  33.90%  32.54% 
Percentage who has ever been told by 
doctor that he has arthritis or rheumatism 
0.00%  0.00%  17.14%  20.05%  13.12%  16.91% 
Percentage who has ever been told by 
doctor that he had emotional, nervous, or 
psychiatric problem 
0.00%  0.00%  7.23%  7.11%  4.30%  5.83% 
Percentage who has ever been told by 
doctor that he had cancer 
0.00%  0.00%  3.21%  3.92%  2.23%  2.97% 
Percentage who receives 
disability/health benefits 
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Table III. Coefficients from Employment Probit Model 
  Healthy Employees / vs 
Health-Impaired People 
having Work-Limitations 
Healthy Employees / vs 
Health-Impaired People having No 
Work-Limitations 





  -1.077 (0.069)*     -0.623 (0.055)*    
AGE  0.061 (0.022)*       0.067 (0.022)*      
AGESQ  -0.0005 (0.0002)*     -0.0006 (0.0002)*     
MARR  0.054 (0.016)*  0.129 (0.057)*      
IMM  -0.224 (0.070)*     -0.184 (0.072)*     
FLUEN  0.053 (0.202)      0.075 (0.217)      
SCHOL  0.092 (0.039)*      0.122 (0.043)*     
GRAD  0.154 (0.047)***       0.156 (0.057)*      
UNIV  0.205 (0.044)*      0.244 (0.044)*    
PC  0.007 (0.044)       0.014 (0.040)     
ENGL  0.033 (0.034)       0.061 (0.030)***      
DRIV  0.265 (0.055)*       0.339 (0.053)*      
EXPER  0.007 (0.013)      0.019 (0.013)     
EXPERSQ  -0.0001 (0.0003)       -0.0005 (0.0003)      
CHIL  0.003 (0.025)      0.056 (0.027)**     
HOMEM  0.018 (0.013)      0.015 (0.013)     
MONTH CONTROLS  YES  YES 
INTERCEPT  -0.030 (0.413)      -0.289 (0.425)     
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% 
level. *** Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table III shows the results of the Probit estimation. The coefficients measure 
the influences of the variables on the probability of male individuals having been 
employed in the previous month. As we can observe, health-impaired people are 
significantly less likely to be employed than healthy people. Among health-impaired 
people, however, those having work limitations face greater chances of being 
unemployed. For both panels, the signs of the coefficients are reasonable. The 
probability of being employed increases with age, marital status, number of children 
and household members, fluency in Greek, working experience, and education. We can 
observe, nevertheless, that the outcomes are not always statistically significant. 
Moreover, the probability of being employed differs according to nationality. Non-
Greeks face significantly lower chances of being employed than Greeks.  
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Table IV. Coefficients from Health-Reporting Conditional Logit Model 
  Health-Impaired People 
having Work-Limitations 
Health-Impaired People having 
No Work-Limitations 
  Panel A  Panel B 
 
AGE  0.079 (0.009)*      0.037 (0.018)*      
AGESQ  -0.0004 (0.0001)*       -0.0003 (0.0001)*    
FA  0.090  (0.028)*      0.060  (0.042)      
DA  0.243 (0.023)*      0.182 (0.043)*     
IA  0.211 (0.021)*      0.236 (0.042)*      
DIA  0.579 (0.018)*      0.564 (0.025)*     
HEA  0.753 (0.009)*      0.732 (0.013)*     
ART  0.485 (0.014)*      0.453 (0.020)*     
PSY  0.484 (0.022)*      0.449 (0.034)*     
CAN  0.650 (0.032)*      0.451 (0.047)*     
DB  0.522 (0.016)*      0.354 (0.022)*    
INTERCEPT  0.002 (0.018)       0.042 (0.024)***     
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% 
level.*** Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table IV shows the results of the Conditional Logit estimation. The coefficients 
explain and identify individuals’ characteristics that are thought to be related to the 
likelihood of reporting health status conditional on work limitations. As we can observe, 
individuals’ choice to report having a health condition increases with age; the existence 
of limitations in functional, daily, and instrumental activities; the existence of objective 
illnesses such as diabetes, heart attack, arthritis, psychological problems, and cancer; as 
well as having disability/insurance benefits. More importantly, the magnitudes of the 
effects are stronger for the health-impaired people with work limitations than for the 
health-impaired people with no work limitations. As shown, all variables are 
statistically significant expect the functional activity variable for the health-impaired 
people having no work limitations. This result is reasonable for this group of people, 
who have limitations, including those involving sight, hearing, and speech, that could 
limit their capacity for work.  